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This paper analyzes the process and dynamics of the protests in the Kyrgyz Republic that led to 
the April 7, 2010 overthrow of the government of President Kurmanbek Bakiev. The paper 
argues that the government overthrow was not a sudden event; rather it was a continuation of a 
long succession of protests and violence that had been occurring for years. The Kyrgyz Republic 
has an endemic problem of solving all political and social problems through street protests and 
violence. The long-term trend is worrisome, as street protests are likely to continue into the 
future unless the government and the opposition find a way to address legitimate grievances 
through democratic institutions. This paper examines the history of Kyrgyz protests by 
comparing the protests in 2002, the government overthrow in 2005, and the events immediately 
prior to the 2010 collapse of the government. It suggests that the framework for the protests was 
similar in all three cases and that government attacks on local political entrepreneurs motivated 
the public to respond. The ineffective use of government force that followed incensed, but did 





On April 7, 2010, angry mobs carrying guns filled the central square in Bishkek, Kyrgyz 
Republic, and after only a few hours of conflict between the armed protesters and security 
personnel in front of the White House, President Kurmanbek Bakiev fled his office. Almost 
exactly five years prior, on March 24, 2005, after ten weeks of protests across the country, 
President Askar Akayev fled the country when crowds of unarmed protesters stormed the White 
House. Unlike 2010, in 2005, no one was killed in the protests.  
These two government overthrows were not isolated events. This paper argues that they were the 
most violent and most severe in a long succession of protests that have occurred periodically for 
months and years at a time. In other words, the Kyrgyz Republic has adopted a culture of protest. 
Demonstrations and protests are the first response for any disgruntled political figure, angry 
citizen, opposition leader, or nongovernmental organization. With no apparent progress toward a 
more genuinely democratic, peaceful way of resolving political disputes, the default will 
continue to be to solve all political and social problems through street protests. 
This paper examines the political protests in 2002, 2005, and 2010 to identify key attributes of 
the process and the outcome of the political events. The sudden collapse of the Kyrgyz 
government in 2005 and 2010 surprised Western policy makers, government officials, and 
academics. Traditional theories of protest behavior, as well as democracy promotion policy, 
provide poor explanations for the political overthrow and sudden violence in the Kyrgyz 
Republic. The role of international democracy funding, Western government influence, and local 
civil society were minor and relatively unimportant in determining the final outcome in either 
event.  
There are some important similarities between the 2005 and 2010 protests. Neither of the protest 
movements was about democracy promotion, external or internal NGO support, or freedom of 
the media. Both overthrows were initiated by local political entrepreneurs motivated by financial 
and personal incentives who took advantage of public discontent and incorporated it into their 
own agendas. Both were exacerbated by a weak central government unwilling or inept at using 
deadly force, and the public perception that the central government made individuals’ lives 
worse.  
This paper focuses on the two most important factors common in all three (2002, 2005, and 
2010) political protests: 1) a popular leader(s) attacked by the government and 2) an overreaction 
by security forces. Two other issues–economic grievances and the limited role of the 
international community—were also of minor importance in 2010.  
The findings of this paper help to explain the dynamics of succession in an unstable region. By 
understanding the causes, conditions, and process of the protests in the Kyrgyz Republic, this 
paper hopes to provide insight into the fundamental societal dynamics that can lead to political 
overthrow. The stability of the Kyrgyz Republic’s neighboring regimes—Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—differs, as does their ability to withstand mass 
protest movements; however, it is unclear to what degree these states may also have hollow 
internal political structures that could collapse if faced with a sudden and unexpected mass 
movement. The collapse of any of these states would have a greater impact than the recent 




The Kyrgyz Republic is a useful case to examine, as it is both an example of an extremely 
reactive protest dynamic and it is similar to regional states in the important role played by 
political entrepreneurs. Over the last several years, small protests in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Tajikistan have supported local political entrepreneurs who have been attacked by their 
respective national governments. In these countries, the culture of protest is not yet endemic and 
the national governments have been willing to use sufficient force to quell any small protests. 
However, local political entrepreneurs in these countries are well aware of the events in the 
Kyrgyz Republic in 2002, 2005, and 2010, and many are waiting for the right opportunity to 
push back against the power structures in their own countries.  
 
Data 
This paper is based on three primary sources. The first is an extensive event database at 
Georgetown University that has records of all significant political actions and violent events that 
took place anywhere in the Kyrgyz Republic from January 1, 2010 to October 31, 2010, as 
recorded by electronic news sources. This database, while lacking some nuances, provides a key 
reference point to show the pattern of localized protests leading to both the April and June 2010 
events.1 
The second source is first-hand field interviews. The author conducted several months of 
extensive field interviews immediately after the spring 2005 events. Less extensive interviews 
were also carried out across the country in the summer and fall of 2010, and brief research trips 
in 2007 and 2008 contributed to the data. Interviews were conducted with NGO leaders, 
opposition leaders, members of government, international observers, and local citizens to 
identify details about the events as well as general attitudes and beliefs toward the government 
and protest events. These were not systematic or randomized interviews; rather, they were in-
depth discussions with a small sample of individuals that were not statistically representative.  
The third source is a survey from the International Republican Institute (IRI). From May 11 to 
May 25, 2010, the IRI carried out its annual survey in the Kyrgyz Republic on perceptions and 
attitudes toward standard of living, the government, security, democracy, etc. IRI, in partnership 
with Baltic Surveys and The Gallup Organization, and funded by USAID, have regularly 
surveyed this population since 2005. I obtained a paper copy with summary results from 2010 





                                                 
1 Kyrgyzstan Event Database, Georgetown University, 2010. 
2 Kyrgyzstan National Opinion Poll, May 2010, International Republican Institute, Baltic Surveys Ltd., The Gallop 




Table 1: Key Events 
1990 June Kyrgyz Uzbek ethnic violence (171 killed) 
1990  Oct President Askar Akyev elected 
2002 March Ak Sai protests (5 killed) 
2005 March President Akyev overthrown 
2010 April President Bakiev overthrown (85 killed) 
2010 June Kyrgyz-Uzbek ethnic violence (490 killed) 
 
Ak Sai, March 2002 
While the Kyrgyz Republic has a long history of local protests and ethnic violence, the 2002 
political protests were the first time political protests led to violence that directly impacted the 
national government. The 2002 events were a rallying point for both the 2005 and the 2010 
protests.3  
A key issue from early 2000 to 2002 was the privatization of agricultural land. In March 2002, 
five people were killed and as many as 62 wounded when police fired on a crowd protesting 
outside the southern city of Kerben, Kyrgyz Republic.4 The crowd had gathered to protest the 
imprisonment of a popular local politician, Azimbek Beknazarov. A parliamentarian from the 
southern region of Jalal-Abad, he had previously been a regional prosecutor and was accused of 
improper conduct. Political analysts and opposition leaders believed that the real reason for his 
arrest was his outspoken criticism of President Askar Akyev and of several land deals that Akyev 
had concluded with China. Almost immediately upon his arrest, crowds formed in the town of 
Kara-Suu in the Jalal-Abad region to protest. Several hundred supporters went on a hunger strike 
to demand his release. A few days after his trial started, the crowd in Kara-Suu took eight 
regional government officials hostage and seized the local government building.5  
As the trial concluded, thousands of demonstrators gathered, blocking roads and marching 
toward the courthouse. 6 Police intervened to stop the gathering and fired into the crowd, killing 
5 people and wounding many more. 7 Kurmanbek Bakiev, one of the leaders of the March 2005 
protests and a future president, was prime minster at the time of the Ak-Sai shootings. Later in 
2002, he “accused people of ‘provoking mass disorder’ in the village of Kerben in the province 
of Jalal-Abad. He said law-enforcement officials were forced to fire in self-defense when the 
protest turned violent.”8  
                                                 
3 The 1990 violence was primarily ethnic in nature and did not start with political protests. 
4 Jones, "Land Privatization and Conflict: Is Kyrgyzstan a Model?," 259. 
5 RFE/RL, February 19, 2002 
6 RFE/RL, March 18, 2002 
7 The actual process of the shooting will never be completely understood, but it is clear that the police fired on an 
unarmed crowd. 




The outcome of these events for the public was an indictment of the security services and an 
increase in distrust of the police. The outcome for the police was a fear of using force on a 
crowd. In 2005 interviews, many security force members referenced the events in 2002 as 
strongly influencing their lack of interest in engaging protesting crowds. The immediate outcome 
of the shooting was that Beknazarov was released from prison under the condition that he would 
try to stop the protests.  
The tactics of the March 2002 protests, the blocking of roads, the seizing of government 
buildings, the taking of hostages, the large-scale local protests, etc., were all reused in March 
2005 and April 2010. In the language of scholar Sindey Tarrow, these had become part of the 
“repertoire of contention.”9 The March 2002 events established boundaries for what protests 
could accomplish and how the mechanisms of protest should be implemented. A key lesson was 
that a crowd of popular protesters could collapse a government. Weeks after the shooting, the 
prime minister and the government were forced to resign. This was the first time that a 
government in the former Soviet Union had been forced to resign because of popular protests. 
Interviewees in both 2005 and 2010 referenced the events in Ak-Sai. These events cumulatively 
served as an important emotional and practical reference point for future protesters. As one local 
reporter commented, “Aksai was not financed. It started in the fields and was only about 
ideology.”10 They also set the pattern that is found in the 2005 and 2010 protests: 1) popular 
leader(s) were attacked by the government and 2) an overreaction by security forces led to a 
collapse of the government. 
 
Bishkek, March 2005 
This section provides an overview of the 2005 events that set the context for 2010.11 Similar to 
the Ak-Sai protests, in 2005, the government alienated local political leaders, and the central 
government increased physical pressure on protesters and opposition leaders through the 
ineffective deployment of security forces. The government’s political repression was the most 
important factor in the protest’s increased intensity and in the collapse of the Akayev 
government. In essence, the government miscalculated the protesters’ relative strength and their 
ability to respond to repression.  
As early as mid-January 2005, months ahead of the March parliamentary elections, protests 
started in Bishkek. By February, protests had started up in isolated communities throughout the 
Kyrgyz Republic. The earliest protests began independently, without contact between protesters 
or regions.  
In response, the government acted mostly forcefully against the various political entrepreneurs 
running for parliamentary positions. On January 7, a regional court ruled that five former 
diplomats could not run for office, because they had failed to live continuously in the country for 
the mandated five years prior to running. 12 One of the diplomats, Roza Otunbaeva, was the 
                                                 
9Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 20. 
10 Interviewee #24. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005. 
11 For a more detailed analysis of the 2005 events see Kevin D Jones, The Dynamics of Civil Protests: A Case Study 
of Protests in the Kyrgyz Republic, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Maryland, May 2007. 




former ambassador to the United Kingdom and the United States, and a leading candidate for the 
presidential elections that fall. Supporters of Otunbaeva protested this exclusion in the capital 
from January 8 until January 31.  
In mid-February, several other popular local politicians were excluded from running because of 
minor infractions of the election code. On February 19, about a week prior to the elections, 
crowds in the eastern town of Kochkor blocked roads to protest their local candidate’s exclusion. 
A few days later, in the far eastern town of Kara Kol, a crowd of about 750 protesters picketed a 
local district court, and another 300 blocked an important transit road to the eastern region. At 
the same time, in the far-western town of Talas, a former Akayev supporter and government 
official was also prevented from running, and more than 1,300 of his supporters protested at a 
district court.  
In one of the largest protests, more than 3,000 supporters of two excluded local candidates 
blocked the road to the poorest region in the country, Naryn. On February 23, the former prime 
minister, Bakiev, visited and spoke with these protesters—the first link between protesters and 
national opposition leaders.13 The following Wednesday, before the elections, protesters 
continued to block key roads, and in the late afternoon in the eastern city of Balykchy, protesters 
for the first time seized a local administrative building.  
As an indication that the protesters were primarily interested in supporting their local candidates, 
protesters in the town of Typ dispersed after a local court reinstated their candidate. The next 
day, February 24, the Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of five popular candidates, 
prompting an immediate increase in local protests, including among supporters of A. Japarov, 
who had seized a government district building in Kochkor.14  
Throughout the first and second rounds of parliamentary elections, local supporters took to the 
streets to support their local leaders. For example, immediately after the election results were 
announced, 600 supporters of A. Tolonov blocked roads and key north-south traffic in the town 
of Kara Suu in Osh oblast; three thousand supporters of T. Alimov protested in the streets in 
Aravan, Osh; 10,000 supporters of Dooronbek Sadyrbaev marched on the mayor’s office in 
Nooken, Jalal-Abad; and finally a few hundred people gathered in Bishkek, “waving yellow and 
pink banners.”15 In general, the largest protests were in the south because more candidates lost 
their seats through the election process in the south. 
On Monday, March 14, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
criticized the second round of the elections for almost the same reasons as it criticized the first. 
Protesters in the south and in the west immediately responded with large-scale protests. One 
thousand supporters of A. Madumarov took over the local government office in the southern 
town of Uzgen, and in a village to the south of Osh, supporters of M. Sultanov blocked the 
                                                 
13 EurasiaDigest, 2-28, Akipress 
14 EurasiaDigest, 2-28, GazteaKG, AKIpress EurasiaDigest, 2-24, 10:06, RFE/RL 
EurasiaDigest, 2-28, Kabar 
15 EurasiaDigest, 3-07, 9:33EST, Burke AFP, 03-01, 2:05GMT 
EurasiaDigest, 3-07, 9:33EST, BurkeAFP, 03-01, 2:05GMT 
EurasiaDigest, 3-07, 9:33EST, Burke   




roads.16,17 In Talas, 2,000 supporters of R. Dzheenbekov gathered at the Oblast Administration, 
and another 3,000 blocked the road between Talas and Taraz, Kazakhstan.18 After protesting for 
several hours in front of the Oblast Administration building, the protesters broke past police 
barricades and seized the central government building.19 They held both the governor of Talas 
and the head of Bakay-Ata district administration as hostages.20 Protesters now controlled the 
Jalal-Abad and the Talas governor’s offices.  
On March 15, in Jalal-Abad, the opposition organized a “Kurultai,” an ancient gathering dating 
back to the selection of Khans and Emirs with the purpose of electing a ruler. The gathering and 
the leader it selected had no legal authority, but the selection process served as powerful 
reminders of ancient customs. Reports differed, but somewhere from about 5,000 to 15,000 
protesters and representatives from throughout the region gathered at the March 15 Kurultai.21 
The selection process was shown to be orderly and well-managed. The main opposition leaders 
appeared and spoke, and Kurmanbek Bakiev was selected as the representative leader of the 
people.22  
After the Kurultai, the protests’ motivation shifted from supporting local political entrepreneurs 
to demonstrating in response to steadily increasing government repression. Believing that 
stronger force was necessary to retake control of the regional government offices, on the 
morning of March 20, at approximately 5:30 am, Ministry of the Interior Special Forces stormed 
the government buildings in Osh and Jalal-Abad and physically removed all of the protesters.23  
According to protester interviews, “each of the men had a police stick. They didn’t differentiate 
[between] ladies or men, they beat up everybody, pulled their hair. We tried to prevent them 
from beating up youngsters, but we got beaten severely.”24 As the protesters were taken away in 
two Kamaz trucks, younger protesters jumped off the back of the trucks fearing that they were to 
be shot. 
One middle-aged woman stated, “I personally thought that I will die, but when we came to Suzak 
and they told us to write explanatory letter I started thinking that I will live further. They scared 
us so much that I thought I will be killed. And then they drove us home, they thought that now 
we are scared and will not do anything.”25 This woman returned to the square later in the day, 
and rejoined the growing protest. News of the attack on women and children spread quickly, as 
did untrue rumors that up to as many as ten protesters had been killed.  
The government’s harsh reaction sparked the opposition and galvanized support from throughout 
the region. More than 10,000 protesters marched on the government building in Jalal-Abad that 
same afternoon. About 2,000 were armed with sticks and stones and used a bus to break down 
the police building. They burned the Interior Services building and the prosecutor’s office. More 
                                                 
16 AFP, 03-14, 5:30PM, GMT 
17 EurasiaDigest, 3-15, 10:12EST 
18 Interfax, 03-14, 1556 GMT 
19 AKIpress 03-14, 15:30GMT 
20 Interfax, 03-15, 7:01GMT 
21 According to video footage reviewed by the author the number appears to be much closer to 5,000. 
22 AFP, 03-15, 11:45GMT 
23 ITAR-TASS, 03-20 
24 Interviewee #51. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005. 




than 700 protesters moved into the Governor’s building, hanging banners out the window 
demanding Akayev’s resignation.26 This was one of the earliest public demands that Akayev 
leave office. 
Two days later, on the afternoon of March 23, a group of NGOs held a rally in Bishkek with the 
goal of providing information about events in the south of the country. The gathering included 
students from Bergi, Kel-Kel, and the American University.27 Most of the speakers were civil 
society leaders who had not been involved in the protests until that point. The meeting was 
eventually broken up by drunks sent into the crowd as agent provocateurs and police, who 
arrested the civil society leaders.28  
The opposition agreed to stage demonstrations in three places in Bishkek the following day: near 
Osh Bazzar (the Nazeraliev center), Koch Jor, and behind the Jorgo Kenesh. The idea was to 
have separate protests so that it would be difficult for the police to break them up.29 According to 
organizational leaders, they expected to spend more than a week, possibly up to ten days, in the 
square. They planned to set up yurts, to have cooking locations, and to have water brought in. 
They did not anticipate that it would all be over in a few hours.30  
By 10 am on March 24, the crowd in front of the Nazaraliev center was growing. Traders from 
the nearby Osh bazaar called out to each other to go to the protest, and nearly the entire bazaar 
shut down, similar to what had happened in Jalal-Abad. The crowd contained many different 
groups, each with placards representing their region and political leader. The event was well 
organized enough that the groups had time to arrive, organize, and make placards. There were 
representatives from all over the country—Naryn, Koch Kor, Jalal-Abad, Talas, Osh, etc. The 
crowd listened to speeches before starting to walk the few miles to the White House. The crowd 
grew in size as it went through the streets. People were reported to be getting off buses, leaving 
from the sidewalk, and coming out of shops to join in the street march. All of the known 
opposition leaders had gathered at the front and led the march. 
Very few members of the crowd had any idea of what was going to happen or what the plan was 
once they reached the White House. The loudest chants were for Akayev to leave, but few 
believed that it would actually happen. The leaders urged the crowd to be prepared to stay on for 
many days and reminded the people that, “We’ve come to get a change in government.” They 
expected a long peaceful demonstration that could lead to an orderly transfer of power.31 
As they walked down the main boulevard, blocking all four lanes of traffic, toward the White 
House and the central square, the peaceful march proceeded unimpeded. Both photographs and 
eyewitnesses reports detail the extent of the crowd—it stretched for miles down the road. Finally, 
the group moved past the White House and gathered in front of the new liberty statue.  
After a few speeches that were given from the side of the park between the White House and the 
crowd, young men started running toward the crowd with shields, wearing helmets and blue 
                                                 
26 AFP, 3-20, 5:08GMT 
27 Interviewee #40. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005. 
28 Interviewee #21. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005. 
29 Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005. 
30 Interviewee #01. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005. 




ribbons, and throwing stones at the protesters. At first, the crowd dispersed, moving toward the 
edges of the square. Opposition leaders called out to the members of the crowd to restrain 
themselves and to seek shelter on the other side of the square, but the “crowd was not able to 
restrain themselves very long.”32The young men in the protest crowd were not going to have a 
small group of men throw stones at them; they picked up the stones thrown at them and started to 
throw them back. People ran away toward the buildings for safety, but when the crowd saw that 
they had all of the stones, they took them and started to throw them back.33 A participant stated, 
“None of the people would have gone to the White House if rocks had not been thrown.”34 
A small group of police, many of them on horses, came down the main avenue (Chui Prospect) 
and pushed the crowd back. But the crowd surged back toward the police, who quickly scattered 
and ran to the gates; some of the police were caught and beaten by the crowd. One young 
protester seized a police horse and galloped around waving a flag and encouraging the protesters. 
By then, some of the protesters had pushed up against the gates of the White House. Between the 
first and second backlash, a crowd of about a 100 young men arrived from Osh wearing yellow 
ribbons. They were sportsman trained in the south and served as an important catalyst in 
responding to the police.35 They marched to the gates of the White House, broke down or 
climbed over the fence surrounding it, and broke into the building.  
No one remained to defend the building. Akayev had left the White House about a half hour 
before it was stormed. A few of his senior government officials remained in the building and 
were beaten. According to a Moscow radio interview with Akayev, the last order that he gave 
was that force should not be used to prevent the taking of the White House.36 
From hours of interviews, it is clear that the protesters, even the “sportsman” who arrived from 
the south, did not intend to overthrow the government through a violent clash. The Akayev 
government minimally repressed the crowd, which angered but did not subdue it.  
 
Bishkek, April 201037 
In the spring and summer of 2007, street protests resumed, with former government officials  
calling for President Bakiev’s resignation. In late fall 2007, Bakiev forced through parliament a 
revised constitution that gave increased powers to the president and led to the dissolution of the 
government and parliamentary elections on December 16, 2007. With little surprise, Bakiev’s 
                                                 
32 Interviewee #54. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005. 
33 Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005. 
34 Interviewee #18. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005. 
35 Interviewee #54. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, 2005. 
36 Ekho Moskvy (Moscow). March 29, 2005 1318 GMT, in Russian. 





party, Ak Zhol, won 71 out of 90 seats in parliament.38 According to the OSCE, the elections 
“failed to meet a number of OSCE commitments.”39  
Leaders of the Ata Meken party called for the resignation of the president and held small-scale 
protests and demonstrations in the spring of 2008. The opposition was unorganized and did not 
have a unified approach. Some opposition leaders were in parliament, including the current 
president, Rosa Otunbayeva, a representative of the Social Democratic Party. The only issue they 
agreed on was getting rid of President Bakiev, but they had no unified platform or agenda.  
The government continued to lose support throughout 2008, during which there were targeted 
beatings and killings of journalists, the imprisonment of a former minister, and the suspicious 
death of a former government official. The Bakiev government was not necessarily directly 
responsible for these events, but it permitted an environment where individuals and sometimes 
other countries could act with impunity. The lawlessness gave the country the sense that it was 
ricocheting out of control.  
In addition to the political dynamics, economic and physical hardships played a role in the 2010 
protests. In November of 2008, severe power shortages affected the country, with the worst 
impact felt in Naryn and Osh. The 2009 winter was also extremely harsh. Combined with the 
power shortages, the weather exposed many people to freezing conditions. 
In January 2009, the Kyrgyz government received $150 million in grants, $300 million in loans, 
and $1.7 billion in business credits from Russia.40 On February 3, President Bakiev went to 
Moscow to meet with the Russian president and prime minister. The next day, Bakiev demanded 
that the United States leave the Manas airbase, north of Bishkek, in 180 days.41 While both 
parties denied any quid pro quo, the sequence of events sent a clear message: Bakiev would look 
toward Russia as its protector and banker, and he didn’t need U.S. support. These events would 
set the stage for Russia’s actions in early 2010. 
In July 2009, the United States and the Kyrgyz Republic reached a new base agreement, with 
U.S. annual payments increasing from $17.4 million to $60 million, in addition to other 
payments and financial support.42 Whether Russia had demanded that the Kyrgyz Republic kick 
out the United States or not, the public message of this later move was that Bakiev would 
negotiate with whomever he wanted and play the United States and Russia against each other. 
In July 2009, Bakiev won a generally uncontested presidential election for another five-year 
term. According to the OSCE preliminary report: 
                                                 
38 “Kyrgyz opposition to hold mass protests against election results”, RIA Novosti, 20/12/2007 
9:34. http://en.rian.ru/world/20071220/93310989.html 
39 Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, Bishkek, 17 December 2007. OSCE Election Observation 
Mission: The Kyrgyz Republic — Pre-term Parliamentary Elections, 16 December 2007 
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2007/12/28916_en.pdf 
40 “Russia transferred $300M concessional loan to Kyrgyzstan”, 24kg News Agency, March 30, 2009 accessed at 
http://eng.24.kg/politic/2009/04/30/7910.html. 
41 David Trilling and Deirdre Tynan, “Kyrgyzstan: President Bakiyev Wants to Close US Military Base Outside 
Bishkek” February 2, 2009 accessed at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav020309b.shtml. 
42 Michael Schwirtz and Clifford J. Levy, “In Reversal, Kyrgyzstan Won’t Close A U.S. Base”, New York Times, 




[T]he 23 July presidential election failed to meet key OSCE commitments for democratic elections, 
including the commitment to maintain a clear separation between party and state. Election day was marred 
by many problems and irregularities, including evidence of ballot box stuffing, inaccuracies in the voter 
lists and some evidence of multiple voting.43  
Unlike in 2005, when parliamentary elections led to countrywide protests, the suspect 2009 
elections led to few major protests or events. The authorities quickly stopped the few that 
occurred in the regions. This turn of events reinforces the argument that Kyrgyz protests are less 
about the national government, and more about local political leaders. When local leaders are 
challenged, then local citizens will protest.  
Indeed, local protests began in early 2010, weeks and months before the March national protests 
that finally overthrew Bakiev. Two main factors sparked these protests—economic grievances 
and the arrest of a local political entrepreneur:  
A wave of demonstrations is spreading across Kyrgyzstan as the population expresses its anger over recent 
utility price hikes and the privatization of key state assets. On March 17, 3,000 people rallied outside the 
Social Democratic Party’s headquarters in the outskirts of Bishkek, urging the government to reverse the 
increase in prices for hot water and electricity introduced January 1.44 
In both 2005 and in 2010, the population believed that the national government was corrupt and 
run by the president’s family. As local populations struggled economically, the crowds were 
incensed by the exorbitant wealth of the president’s family. In 2005, a popular newspaper printed 
a listing of Akayev’s “private financial investments.” In 2010, a Russian paper published a 
similar list of the financial interests that were controlled directly by President Bakiev’s family.  
In addition, the population blamed the state for the electricity tariff increases and felt they had a 
justified grievance. In late November 2009, the government announced a significant increase in 
electricity tariffs, tariffs that directly impacted almost every citizen. As a regional commentator 
wrote in early February, “Heating costs are rising by 400 percent; electricity by 170 percent. The 
price of hot water—a fee calculated according to the size of a resident’s dwelling—more than 
doubled at the start of the year.”45  
The electricity tariffs became one of the most important issues across a wide range of citizens. In 
the May 2010 IRI survey, respondents said “increased tariffs for electricity” were the second 
biggest (21%) mistake of the Bakiev government (see Figure 1). When asked, “What was the 
most important achievement of the interim government?” 32 percent listed “Reducing tariffs on 
electricity”; the second most common response (at 8 percent) was “Attempts to stabilize situation 




                                                 
43 OSCE Election Observation Mission: Kyrgyz Republic—Presidential Elections, 23 July 2009, “Statement of 
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At the same time that the government announced the increase in electricity tariffs, the winter 
brought with it record-breaking cold weather and severe power outages. This further incensed the 
general populace, which saw a decrease in service and an increase in cost. While the tariff 
increase was implemented nationally, the impact differed by region. For instance, in the Naryn 
region, where the impact was the most severe, locals protested against both the national issue and 
local governance structures.  
Similar to events in 2002 and 2005, an attack on a popular local political entrepreneur 
precipitated the protests. In early January, the Bakiyev government arrested and imprisoned 
Ismail Isakov, a popular politician and a former minister of defense, for corruption and other 
charges. In response, his supporters in the south launched daily, small-scale protests and hunger 
strikes. By early April, these protests had grown, and Isakov had come to be seen by a wider 
group as a symbol of the opposition. He was freed on April 7 by the protesters who overthrew 
the government, and the interim administration reinstated him to his position as minister of 
defense.  
News articles describing events during a seven-day period from January 8 to 14 show how the 
electricity tariff increases and support for local political entrepreneurs had melded together by 
January 11, see Table 2.47  
 
                                                 







1/8/2010 Residents of Naryn Petition Against Utility Rate Hike 
1/8/2010 Multiple Apartment Buildings in Jalalabat Cut Off From Heat, Electricity 
1/11/2010 Military Court Sentenced Ismail Isakov to Eight Years Imprisonment 
1/11/2010 Supporters of Isakov, Detractors of Higher Energy Tariffs Join for Protest in 
Gulcha 
1/12/2010 OND Political Party Announces Hunger Strike to Protest Incarcerations of Opposition 
Members 
1/13/2010 In Bishkek 8 Start Hunger Strike To Protest Imprisonment of Former Defense Minister 
Ismail Isakov 
1/13/2010 In Sopu-Korgon 100 Demonstrate against imprisonment of Isakov 
1/14/2010 United Populist Movement Says Governor Ordered Police to Break Up Isakov Supporter's 
Hunger Strike in Sopu-Korgon 
1/14/2010 Kyrgyzstani Press Publishes Prediction that Poverty and Homelessness Will Increase as 
Result of Increaed Energy Tariffs 
 
In the first three months of 2010, local populations held 81 demonstrations throughout the 
country, see Figure 3. In March, the opposition, some of whom were elected deputies in the 
parliament, organized a “People’s Kurultai” to call for changes in the constitution, tariffs, and 
privatization, and for the exoneration of political figures, among other issues.  
Similar to the 2005 Kurultai, where the opposition selected K. Bakiev as its leader, the 2010 
opposition Kurultai established an executive committee and selected deputy Rosa Otunbayeva as 
its head. Otunbayeva was expected to deliver the opposition’s long list of unrealistic tasks and 
demands to the government, asking for them all to be met within a week.48 The exact number of 
























In a nod to previous protests, on March 15, 2010, two days before the Kurultai, Otunbayeva 
called for a march to commemorate the victims of the 2002 Ak-Sai protest shootings. The protest 
proceeded on March 17, the eighth anniversary of the Ak-Sai events, and was specifically 
designed to rally support for the opposition.49 
On April 6, about 500 civilians led by opposition party Ata-Meken leader Shernyazov seized the 
provincial administration building in Talas Oblast and appointed Shernyazov as the people’s 
governor. In retaliation, police stormed the building and temporarily gained control of it before 
more than a thousand protesters retook control. The government’s interior minister, who arrived 
to attempt to negotiate with the protesters, was kidnapped and severely beaten.  
In Bishkek, police arrested opposition political entrepreneurs, including Atambayev, Sariyev, 
Tekebayev, and Omurkulov, all of whom were released the next day. According to several 
participants in the protests, these arrests and the government violence directed toward the 
protesters directly led to the gathering the next day.50  
Table 3: Key Events, 2010 
January 21 demonstrations against the government including hunger strikes and protests in 
support of jailed former Defense Minister Ismail Isakov 
February 27 demonstrations against the government including a February 24th demonstration 
in Naryn where more than 2000 protest increased electricity tariffs 
February Government starts to block independent news sites 
March 17 Opposition holds a Kuralti and selects Rosa Roza Otunbayeva as the leader of the 
executive council 
March 23 Bakiev holds the government sponsored Assembly of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan 
gathering where regional supporters are critical of his leadership 
March 23 Russian channel NTV broadcasts “investigation” into Maxim Bakiyev and family 
April 6th 1000+ protesters seize government buildings in Talas 
 The government arrests numerous opposition party leaders 
April 7th Regional protests occur in Naryn, Talas, Chui and Issyk-Kul oblasts 
 In Bishkek, thousands of protesters storm the center square, 85 protesters are killed; 
hundreds wounded 
 President Bakiyev flees to south 
 Rosa Otunbayeva declares that the interm government is in power 
April 8 Putin calls interim government 
April 10 Clinton calls interim government 
April 15 President Bakiyev leaves for Belarus  
May 14 President Bakiyev’s family house is burned in Jalalabad 
May 19 Kadyrjon Batyrov’s University is attacked 
June 10 Ethnic violence starts in Osh 
June 11-16 Ethnic violence continues 
June 12 Uzbekistan opens border for refugees 
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On the morning of April 7, a crowd of about six-hundred demonstrators gathered at the Social 
Democratic Party office just outside of downtown Bishkek. The police responded to the 
gathering by deploying armored personnel carriers (APC or BTRs in Russian), and fired tear gas 
and warning shots to break up the crowd. This only incensed the crowd, which quickly 
overwhelmed the police officers and seized their weapons. The protesters took control of one of 
the BTRs and overturned another. From video and photos of the protests, as well as interviews 
with participants, it appears that some of the protesters arrived at the scene with automatic 
weapons and others took them from the security services and used them against the government.  
The protesters then moved toward the White House. By the time they reached the main square, a 
few blocks from the White House, the crowd had grown to several thousand. It is difficult to say 
where these additional protesters came from. From reports and photos, the vast majority of them 
were male ranging in age from their teens to their mid-50s. According to two eyewitnesses, taxi 
drivers, shop owners, people on buses, and general citizens all joined in with the group that 
moved toward the White House.51 Upon reviewing photos and film of the protests, it appears as 
though there were also men in the crowd who had military training and knew how to properly 
use automatic weapons and drive the BTRs. One individual said that he had fought in 
Afghanistan and had not been in a BTR since, but that when he climbed in one, he remembered 
how to drive.52 
The government initially sent a small number of inexperienced riot police trainees into the 
crowds. Again, based on information gathered from photos and film of the events, the protesters 
attacked the riot police, often stealing their shields and guns in the process. At the start, the 
security forces appeared to use rubber bullets against the crowds, but at some point, they started 
using live ammunition, and the protesters started to return fire with automatic weapons. There 
were reports of snipers firing on the crowd from on top of the government buildings. Official 
reports claim that 85 people were killed and hundreds were wounded during the protests. 
After only a few hours of fighting, the crowd drove a BTR into the White House gates and broke 
through into the main compound. The crowd seized the White House and took control of the 
center square. Later that evening, Otunbayeva met with Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov, and the 
government officially resigned their posts. On a seized television station, the opposition 
broadcasted that an interim government had taken power. Otunbayeva said that the interim 
government would stay in power for six months until new presidential elections could be held.  
President Bakiev flew from Bishkek to Jalal-Abad, his home city where he previously enjoyed 
strong support. He refused to resign and reaffirmed that he was the elected president. For a few 
days, the situation remained tense, as the interim government had little control over Bishkek, 
and, similar to 2005, looters damaged shopping centers and small shops.  
The Russian government immediately recognized Otunbayeva and Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin personally called her to offer support. This put the United States in a difficult situation, 
since Bakiev, the fairly elected president hadn’t resigned, and no other official action had been 
taken. According to Michael McFaul, special assistant to the president for national security 
affairs and senior director for Russian affairs, President Medvedev and President Obama talked 
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while in Prague on April 8, the day after the events. The two presidents agreed that it was in their 
interest to cooperate and support the interim government. McFaul also says that in this 
conversation Russia did not mention the need to close the Manas airbase. McFaul went on to say 
in a White House Briefing:  
The people that are allegedly running Kyrgyzstan—and I'm emphasizing that word because it’s not clear 
exactly who’s in charge right now—these are all people we’ve had contact with for many years. They’re 
not—this is not some anti-American coup. That we know for sure. And this is not a sponsored-by-the-
Russians coup.53 
Over the next few days, President Bakiev tried to rally support both internally and externally. On 
April 14, Bakiev addressed a crowd of supporters in Osh that turned on him and threw stones and 
other objects. According on one journalist who observed the event, “This was the final 
humiliation for Bakiyev, he was so personally shocked by the crowd’s response, he was that out 
of touch with the mood and sentiment in the country.”54 The next day, Bakiev flew to 
Kazakhstan, his plane refueled and eventually landed in Belarus where he was welcomed by 




At the end of the 1800s, French sociologist Gustave Le Bon wrote about the leaders of crowds, 
“In the case of human crowds, the chief is often nothing more than a ringleader or agitator, but as 
such he plays a considerable part.”55 In the events in the Kyrgyz Republic these “chiefs” played 
the key role in promoting the initial protests and giving structure to later protests. In addition to 
advancing the explicit political goals of the protests, these political entrepreneurs often used the 
protests to advance their personal, political, and business interests.  
The protests in 2002, 2005, and 2010 were encouraged by local political entrepreneurs and 
lacked both external and internal civil society support. The political entrepreneurs both 
motivated the protesters and provided resources such as food, lodging (tents and yurts), and 
transportation. These political entrepreneurs used the initial public discontent about the 2005 
elections and the 2010 energy price increases to encourage and support public protests and then 
incorporated the protests into their own agendas. The local protests increased in intensity because 
local leaders were able to use broad popular dissatisfaction with both presidents Akayev and 
Bakiev for their own purposes.  
Field interviews indicate that both the 2005 and 2010 protests grew because of a combination of 
protesters’ personal grievances about their general socio-economic conditions and dissatisfaction 
with the national government. These grievances had existed for many years, but in each of the 
                                                 
53 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs Holds a White House 
News Briefing, April 8, 2010. 
54 Interviewee #13. Interviewed by Author. Kyrgyz Republic, September, 2010. 




periods, the jailing or persecution of political entrepreneurs threatened the benefits that 
individuals had accrued through entrepreneurs’ actions.  
The protests and events in 2005 were primarily a response to government oppression and actions. 
In 2005, political entrepreneurs who were attacked politically by the Akayev government 
responded by mobilizing their communities and supporters. These political entrepreneurs were 
intrinsically important to their local community: they provided access to the government, access 
to financial support, and assisted the people in their local communities. In 2005, they were the 
protest leaders.  
The majority of evidence indicates that the initial protests were organized around a single local 
leader and employed whatever local means, e.g. blocking strategic roads or attacking buildings, 
that would disrupt government operations the most.  As noted earlier, these actions were part of 
the protester’s repertoire and were used successfully in 2000, 2002 and 2005.  
In 2005, the political entrepreneurs that spearheaded the protests came from different 
backgrounds and had little in common other than that they were all politically attacked by the 
Akayev government. One of the most important figures was Beknazarov, who came from the 
southern town of Ak Sai. As mentioned previously, Beknazarov played a critical role in the 2002 
events. In spite of regular pressure from the White House, he maintained some marginal loyalty 
to the regime. Over time, though, the government continued to push Beknazarov away. One 
international observer pointed out that it was the White House that turned Beknazarov into a 
revolutionary national figure.56 
In Talas, a province to the west of the capital, the 2005 protests gathered in support of R. 
Jenbekov, who had formerly been a member of the president’s inner circle. The government had 
prevented him from running in the election because it wanted to make way for a relative of the 
President’s wife to run. He had not been a part of the opposition prior to these events and never 
played an active role in working with the opposition until the very end of the protests. The White 
House’s actions had the effect of driving him to become part of the opposition and motivating his 
supporters to eventually seize the government building in Talas.57 His only stated goal was to 
have the opportunity to run for office and to be a parliamentarian and he was not closely linked 
with the main opposition groups, yet he ended up leading one of the largest protests in the 
country and occupying the second government building after Jalal-Abad.58   
In 2010, the initial support for jailed former government leader Ismail Isakov was an important 
catalyst for the protests. The attack on the Jalalabad government building and the arrest of Ata-
Meken leader Shernyazov further motivated the protesters.  
On April 6, 2010, the evening before the collapse of the government, the Bakiev regime arrested 
and attacked several popular opposition leaders including Atambayev, Sariyev, Tekebayev, and 
Omurkulov. These events are similar to the events of March 23, 2005, a day before the 
overthrow of that government, when opposition leaders were rounded up, beaten, and 
imprisoned. Many of the protesters who came out into the streets on March 24, 2005 were there 
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because of the previous day’s events. The response was the same in 2010. Escalated attacks on 
popular leaders directly led to large crowds of supporters the next day. 
Without these the attacks on political entrepreneurs and their role in mobilizing supporters, the 
2005 and 2010 government overthrows would probably not have occurred. 
 
Increased physical pressure 
In both 2005 and 2010, the Kyrgyz government’s use of political repression was the primary 
cause of the increase in the protests’ intensity and the ultimate collapse of the Akayev and 
Bakiev governments. The government miscalculated the relative strength of the protests and their 
ability to respond to repression.  
Nearly all interviewees identified several key events as examples of the Akayev government’s 
increased physical pressure, pressure that ultimately galvanized the opposition. The use of 
special forces on the morning of the March 20, 2005, to throw out protesters from the 
government buildings in Osh and Jalal-Abad was probably the most important action that set in 
motion the events leading to the overthrow on the 24th. Without this event, and those that 
followed on March 23 and 24, the groups probably would have reached a stalemate or a 
negotiated agreement.  
The special forces’s removal of protesters from the Jalal-Abad government building, prompted a 
powerful reaction later in the day, when the protesters violently re-took the building. In many 
ways, this action presaged the taking of the White House a few days later.59  
As discussed above, on the evening of the 23rd, the government used excessive and aggressive 
tactics to break up a civil society meeting in Bishkek. If the meeting had passed without incident, 
protesters would have had virtually no incentive to act aggressively toward the government. 
Instead, the public hauling away and beating of well-respected civil society leaders—in full view 
of international diplomatic representatives and the press—completely undercut any lingering 
international support that may have existed for the Akayev regime. 
The final events of the 2005 and 2010 protests, on March 24, 2005 and April 7, 2010, are the 
clearest example of how repression leads to reactive dynamics. It is reasonable and defendable to 
assert that neither president would have been chased out of the White House if he had not 
provoked the crowds gathered in Bishkek. Interviews with participants in both the 2005 and 
2010 protests reiterated the point that people on the square said that they never would have 
attacked the White House if they had not been provoked by the government forces.   
In 2005, the White House used sportsmen as agitators to try to provoke the crowd into violence. 
There are few indications that the 2005 crowd had any violent intentions. The mix of people in 
the street included a large number of women and high-school aged children who were protesting 
peacefully; many of the protesters waved flags and carried flowers.   
                                                 




In 2010, the mood was different. There were no youth opposition groups or student groups 
protesting, and there were no speeches given or tents set up to provide food, as there were in 
2005. The 2010 protests were not planned to be peaceful. Those that came to the White House in 
2010 were more intent on attacking the government. The force used against the protesters in 
2010 was significantly greater and more professional than it had been in 2005. If the same level 
of force had been used five years earlier, Akayev would have remained in power. The 2010 
protesters knew that the government had been overthrown under similar circumstances only five 
years earlier. While the government resistance was greater in 2010, the protesters were better 
prepared with shields, sticks, and guns. They came anticipating a fight and ready to overwhelm 
the guards. However, if they had not been attacked the night before and earlier that morning, it is 
unlikely that the crowd would have had the motivation or support to attack the White House. 
A second key difference in 2010 was the government’s decision to use deadly force against the 
protesters. This enabled the protesters to seize police and security forces’ weapons, which only 
added to the weapons that the protesters had brought to the center square. In 2005, neither 
security forces nor protesters used automatic weapons. In 2010, the government deployed snipers 
on nearby roof tops to pick off protesters on the center square.  
It is unclear from field research to what extent the 2010 protesters came to the protests with 
weapons and what percentage of protesters’ weapons were seized from the military. This is an 
important point for future research, as it provides some insight into the degree of preparedness of 
the protesters. Even if some of the civilians arrived with weapons, they were still in the minority, 
and their presence did not justify the use of extreme force by the government. The closest 
historical analogy is the Uzbek government’s use of force in Andijon in 2005. In Andijon, some 
protesters arrived with weapons, but they were a small fraction of the total group. The Uzbek 
government responded to the protests with overwhelming force to guarantee that the protesters 
could not respond and overwhelm the security forces.60  
In both 2005 and in 2010, government leaders severely miscalculated the relative strength and 
anger of the crowds. In both cases, they used an underwhelming and ineffective amount of force, 
which only increased the potential for a severe response from the crowd. In 2005, if the crowds 
had not been attacked, they would not have stormed the gates. In 2010, if the morning protests 
had not been disrupted by police, the protesters may not have stormed the building. One 
important difference in the protests was that in 2010, it was more an issue of when protestors 
would storm government buildings not if. It’s clear that the protesters were determined to throw 
out Bakiev and were looking for an opportunity to do so.  
If either Akayev or Bakiev had used overwhelming deadly force against the protesters, he or they 
could have remained in power. Akayev, to his credit, made a conscious choice to limit the 
amount of force used against the crowds. In contrast, Bakiev was clearly willing to use deadly 
force against the crowd, but either the police and military were incompetent or they chose not to 
completely follow orders. In 2002 and 2005, some police choose to side with the protesters. In 
2010, its unclear how much of the police’s reaction was choice and how much was 
incompetence.  
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Just as the March 2002 events provided a template for the 2005 protesters to seize local 
government buildings, the 2005 events demonstrated that crowds storming the White House 
could unseat the government. Interviewees in 2010 mentioned the image of protesters 
successfully forcing Akayev from office as a key psychological factor in their success, in spite of 
the much stronger security resistance.  
While the counter-factual is impossible to prove, if the 2005 protests had failed to remove 
Akayev and he left power peacefully after an election, the 2010 crowd of protesters would not 
have likely had the temerity to believe that it could remove a president from office. In 2005, the 
Akayev government was so internally weak, that when the protesters bumped up against its 
façade, to their shock and surprise it fell over. In 2010, the Bakiev government was empirically 




In 2010, external factors, in particular the influence of Russia, played a role in the protests that 
was not seen in 2002 and 2005. There is virtually no evidence that Russia played a direct role in 
overthrowing the Bakiev regime, but some of its actions immediately prior to April 2010 
signaled its disapproval of Bakiev. These may have given a tacit stamp of approval to the 
protests and signaled an informal willingness to end the Bakiev regime.  
Russian Prime Minister Putin announced in early 2010 that Russia would freeze its loans to the 
Kyrgyz Republic and would not provide the second tranche of funds that had been agreed upon 
in February 2009. This was seen as a strong rebuke of the Bakiev regime. Russian officials 
downplayed it publicly, stating that the freeze was meant to give them time to review the use of 
the funds, but in several interviews, Russian officials said that they felt cheated by Bakiev and 
that the money had gone solely for personal gain. A U.S. Congressional Research Service report 
found that Putin specifically told the Kyrgyz prime minister that the funds were stopped for two 
reasons: the theft of money and the failure to remove the U.S. airbase at Manas.61 
Moscow’s actions resonated with the general Kyrgyz public and confirmed that Moscow was not 
pleased with the family in the White House. In late fall 2009, the popular Russian online news 
site, Lenta.ru, ran a brief article about the appointment of Maxim Bakiev, the president’s son, to 
head the committee on investment and referred to him as the “gray cardinal of the Kyrgyz 
economy.”62 On the 5th anniversary of the 2005 overthrow, the news station NTV ran a highly 
critical “news investigation” into the actions of Maxim.63 While the report offered little that was 
new or shocking to those who followed the internal political situation, it was significant news 
since it was broadcast by a Russian government-controlled news station and provided some of 
the strongest public innuendo to date about Maxim’s corruption and control of foreign 
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investments, and his associations with the criminal world. As one local NGO leader said, 
Moscow provided “the mandate from heaven” that Bakiev could be pushed out.64  
In the 2010 IRI survey, 96 percent of those surveyed said that the Kyrgyz Republic should give 
priority to Russia in international relations. The Russian government also received a 92-percent 
positive opinion rating compared to 43 percent for the U.S. government. In questions evaluating 
the work of institutions, the media had the highest ratings compared to government, NGOs, and 
even religious organizations. The U.S. role in the events of 2010 were minor, and the U.S. 
government’s support for Otunbayeva immediately after Bakiev was forced from office probably 
did little more than send a signal to other Western countries that this was someone to support. In 
the Kyrgyz Republic, it made almost no difference. Some U.S. officials claim that the U.S. 
Manas Air Transit Center was an important factor leading to the government’s overthrow, 
because of the perception of corruption related to the fuel contracts and the Bakiev regime .65 
While some opposition leaders raised this issue after the March events, in the eyes of the general 
public, the Bakiev family was corrupt for a long list of reasons that may or may not have 
included the Transit Center. This U.S. accusation made little difference to the public’s perception 
of the family, and specifically of Maxim, as corrupt. 
 
Conclusion 
The Kyrgyz Republic has a pattern of protest that has been antithetical to ordered democratic 
process for the past ten years. It is difficult to identify the causes and effects of the political 
protests. The history of street protests and the mobilization of local supporters to solve political 
problems has led to a lack of trust in the official process and has weakened and endangered local 
government institutions. Yet, it is also possible that the public’s lack of trust and weak 
institutions make protests the only viable avenue for the public to express its grievances. Either 
interpretation leads to the conclusion that both local and national governments need to be 
strengthened to decrease the potential for future violent protests and in order to fulfill basic 
public demands.  
The dynamics of the 2010 protests were almost identical to those from 2002 and 2005: the 
government attacked popular local leaders, the public protested, security forces overreacted in 
response, protesters seized government buildings, and the national government collapsed. In all 
of these protests, the role of political entrepreneurs and their relationship to the general 
population was the most important factor that led to the protests. All of the initial protests were 
grounded in local support for local leaders who were being pressured by the government. The 
central government’s ineffective response and the public’s perception of government corruption 
or mismanagement justified the protests’ escalation.  
The Kyrgyz Republic stands out among all former Soviet states in terms of the relative strength 
of its political entrepreneurs compared to the weakness of the central government. Other Central 
Asian countries have a much stronger central government and have so far limited local protests 
and quickly stopped regional leaders from gaining a national voice. The few public protests in 
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these other countries have followed distinctly different patterns. Many of them have been either 
locally based without clear political entrepreneur support (Uzbekistan food riots) or grounded in 
national-level political opposition (Kazakhstan).  
The Kyrgyz pattern of protest is so deeply rooted that the most effective threat used by political 
entrepreneurs is that they will call out their supporters to protest or demonstrate on a particular 
issue. This represents a failure of the Kyrgyz democratic process. A functioning democracy 
depends on a functioning legal process. If leaders can be chosen by mass protests, courts 
overthrown by the most vocal opponent, and presidents removed by a crowd of a few hundred, 
democracy does not exist. Until the Kyrgyz Republic can establish institutions through which 
political entrepreneurs can address legitimate concerns and grievances, street protests will 
continue to serve as the solution to all political, social, and economic problems. 
In its relations with the Kyrgyz Republic, the international community confronts the need to both 
support local governance and democratic reform and simultaneously support actions, such as 
street protests, that directly undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions. This inherent 
contradiction can only be resolved by supporting the institutional development of courts and a 
legislative body that can be both responsive to the will of the people, but also stable enough to 
withstand shifts of public attitudes.  
The Kyrgyz government faces the difficult challenge of balancing the use of force to maintain 
basic order and having that force serve as a catalyst for increased protests. Any use of force  even 
to justifiably maintain public order, can cause the government to lose legitimacy. The only long-
term solution to this dynamic is for the Kyrgyz people to use institutions and political processes 
to resolve grievances. The government also has to commit to supporting the national and local 
governmental institutions and not overriding local court decisions. As long as neither the public 
nor the government are willing to use governance institutions, the cycle of political protests will 
continue with a greater probability for escalating use of force by both protesters and the 
government.  
The primary purpose of this paper was to compare the events of 2005 and 2010 in the Kyrgyz 
Republic and to show the common theme of local protests in support of local entrepreneurs. The 
paper’s thesis is that the Kyrgyz pattern of protests as a solution for all political problems  was 
the primary factor behind the April 7, 2010 government overthrow. When protests are seen as the 
only solution to any problem, and when past experience shows that protests can indeed solve 
problems (e.g. remove a president, change a governor, or remove an ethnic group), then the 
public will continue to use these “successful” practices, and they will continue to have a 
debilitating impact.  
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